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SCHAFFER'S REMINDER: IDEA NEEDS
ANOTHER IMPROVEMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Two Disabled Sons
Law is meaningless in the abstract. Only when you see a given
law's effects, both good and bad, on the lives of actual people, can
you begin to appreciate that law's strengths and failures. Often, new
rules of law must be fashioned without that wider perspective; only
after implementation can knowledge of that law's effects help im-
prove it. In the interim, between a law's creation and its improve-
ment, real people must struggle with the law's shortcomings.
I saw this phenomenon firsthand during my years working in the
special education field. During this time, I became familiar with a
retired man who had started a second family. One of the man's sons
from his first family had difficulty reading and dropped out of high
school as a result. The boy's difficulties began in a Midwest elemen-
tary school during the early 1960s, where neither his teachers nor his
parents could explain his inability to grasp even the most basic con-
cepts of written language. As he progressed into middle school, he
exhibited several strengths that compounded the mystery, like a
strong oral vocabulary and a high aptitude for solving mechanical and
mathematical problems. His father, a wealthy man, paid for several
experts to evaluate the boy and provide advice. Those experts diag-
nosed dyslexia (this dispelled one teacher's assumption that the boy's
problem arose from a lack of discipline). The experts also convinced
the school to implement a support program for the boy, exempting
him from a foreign language requirement and allowing him extended
test-taking time. While these accommodations made high school more
tolerable for the boy, they did nothing to improve his ability to read,
write, or spell; essentially, they amounted to assistance in completing
his course work. Eventually, the severity of the boy's dyslexia over-
whelmed the support program, and he withdrew from school in the
early 1970s.
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Unfortunately, this occurred only a few years before Congress ex-
tended the benefits of disability-based legislation to the learning dis-
abled. The Education of All Handicapped Act (EAHC) changed the
definition of a disabled student, expanding it beyond the traditional
categories of physical impairment and low I.Q. 1 Under the new defi-
nition,2 bright public school students with a specific reading disabil-
ity, autism, or emotional difficulties could obtain the "full educational
opportunity" promised by the Act (now called the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)).3
Years later, the same father had started a second family and sent
another son to public school. Again, this boy encountered great diffi-
culty reading and, after testing, received a diagnosis of dyslexia. The
father, though concerned, was now aware of techniques for combating
the disability, and assumed that his son's school would implement
those techniques. Upon further research, however, the father learned
that he would have to pay separately for his son's teachers to learn
those techniques, and that the school could not necessarily implement
them. In short, the school was only bound to provide accommodations
to the boy, not the "remediation" that would follow from direct, one-
on-one teaching using the most effective methods for overcoming
dyslexia. Fortunately, the school's administrators and teachers proved
eager to develop a program that gave the boy far more support than
was legally required. Most learning disabled students, however, are
not so lucky. The happier story of the second son turned on research
advances and on his family's financial resources; but the story did
not, as Congress would have hoped, arise from the strength of IDEA.
B. Background
Families of learning disabled (LD) students without access to addi-
tional income or such dedicated school districts find that the law of-
fers little support. Although Congress has acknowledged the need for
such support, the 1975 legislation and its amendments provide those
LD students with little more than accommodations. IDEA does not
present the word "accommodations" as the standard requirement for
LD students, yet courts and school districts have implemented the law
as if accommodations alone will satisfy the statute's goals. While
such accommodations benefit LD kids, those students cannot achieve
I Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773-
796 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (2005)).
2 The Education for All Handicapped Act of 1975 generally broadened the definition of
"child with a disability" and specifically added learning disabilities to the definition. Pub. L. No.
94-142, § 4(a)(l), 89 Stat. 775 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(i)).
3 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(2).
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Congress's goal of "full opportunity" without the added component of
remediation. Accommodation involves removing requirements that
apply to other students. Examples include untimed tests, allowing a
calculator on math exams, and waiving a foreign language require-
ment. Remediation, on the other hand, consists of direct instruction to
LD students, instruction that will alleviate or even eradicate the dis-
ability. Accommodation provides LD students with relief from the
many burdens of a mainstream education; remediation allows those
students to obtain the wherewithal to return to that challenging envi-
ronment and compete in it successfully. In short, remediation can
ultimately make accommodation unnecessary. Therefore, for LD stu-
dents, the 1975 Act's mandate of full educational opportunity can
only be satisfied through both accommodation and remediation. That
gap between Congress's educational promises and the reality of many
special education programs leaves most parents of most LD students
with the painful choice between fighting a legal war and accepting an
unnecessary ceiling for their child's progress. In a significant number
of cases, parents bringing IDEA-based claims obtain services that
amount to remediation. 4 Yet those cases have not changed or height-
ened IDEA's substantive legal requirement; schools still need only
provide an individualized education of some benefit to the disabled
student. Many of the courts awarding remediation have simply con-
cluded that the given student's disability is so severe, and the school's
proposed plan so inadequate, that remediation constitutes the only
means of satisfying IDEA's modest requirement of an individualized,
beneficial education. Most LD students, however, do not find them-
selves in such dire circumstances, but still stand in dire need of
IDEA's entitlement to a "full educational opportunity." The parents
of this vast majority of LD students face an almost impossible task of
obtaining the kind of educational services that would serve IDEA's
purpose.
Parents' struggles with an LD child's school district would dimin-
ish considerably by instituting greater statutory requirements for
teacher training. Particularly in the case of LD children with average
or above-average intelligence, techniques for combating the disability
almost always run counter to teachers' and school administrators'
intuition.5 Many LD students often socialize with grace and excel at
athletics, but also neglect assignments in order to avoid the embar-
4 See Evans v. Board of Education, 930 F. Supp. 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) and Florence Co.
School District Four v. Shannon Carter, 510 U.S. 7, (1993) for two classic examples.
5 Christine Gorman, The New Science of Dyslexia, TIME, July 28, 2003, at 53, 53 (dis-
cussing the special gifts of dyslexia and the false assumptions made about students who suffer
from the condition).
2006]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
rassment of revealing their weaknesses; as a result, their disability
often eludes detection.6 In a pattern that defies documentation but
pervades the U.S. education system, teachers will often conclude that
the LD student willfully neglects his work out of sloth or defiance.7
This assumption simply gains reinforcement in teachers' minds when
the student speaks intelligently and knowledgably on topics not ad-
dressed in the classroom or in assigned readings.8
Even when accurate diagnosis of a learning disability does occur,
schools often fail to fully address the difficulty.9 As opposed to the
physically handicapped and the retarded, LD students require more
than accommodations. Untimed tests and the removal of a foreign
language requirement certainly benefit LD students immensely, but
such measures do not, alone, provide the same opportunity for an LD
student to reach the potential that the accommodations, standing
alone, provide for the other handicapped groups. For example, since
most wheelchair-bound children will remain in that physical state
permanently, providing handicap access to the school may constitute
all the help a school district can give such students.' 0 Similarly, few
low-I.Q. students ever achieve a higher intelligence, and so remedial
instruction that accommodates their limited intellect suffices in pro-
viding them a parallel opportunity to achieve their potential."
A bright LD child requires more than accommodation to reach his
full capability. In cases of children with autism, Asperger's Syn-
drome, attention deficit disorder (ADD), attention deficit hyperactiv-
ity disorder (ADHD), auditory processing disorder, and dyslexia, the
disability can be ameliorated or even rendered inconsequential.
12
Neurological and cognitive research has produced scientifically
proven techniques for remediating bright LD children and adoles-
6 See Social and Emotional Problems Related to Dyslexia, FACT SHEET 49 (Int'l Dyslexia
Assoc., Bait., Md.), May 2004, at 3, http://www.interdys.org/fact%20sheets/Soc-Emo%20FS%
20N.pdf [hereinafter IDA] (explaining how the special talents of dyslexics lead observers to
doubt the diagnosis).
7 See Gorman, supra note 5, at 53.
8 See IDA, supra note 6, at I ("[Dyslexics'] teachers see a bright, enthusiastic child who
is not learning to read and write. Time and again, dyslexics and their parents hear, 'He's such a
bright child; if only he would try harder.' Ironically, no one knows exactly how hard the dys-
lexic is trying.").
9 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Educ., To Raise Achievement of Students with Dis-
abilities, Greater Flexibility Availability for States, Schools (Dec. 14, 2005), at 2-3 (comment-
ing on the pervasive failure of schools to understand learning disabilities and to challenge LD
students accordingly).
10 See IDA, supra note 6, at 2.
11 Muncy v. Apfel, 247 F.3d 728, 734 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing the common presumption
that one's low I.Q. will remain low throughout life).
12 Id. at 54.
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cents. 13 Although these techniques are most effective for mildly LD
students, severely disabled LD students can nonetheless achieve aca-
demic progress by receiving such remediation.
14
Even though some of these techniques gained prominence as early
as the 1950s, state education departments and individual school dis-
tricts have been slow to implement them. Even the lucky LD student
who obtains a diagnosis and accommodations seldom receives the
proven benefit of specialized instruction. 15 In comparison, consider a
physically handicapped child. Imagine that this child possesses the
capability (through proper physical therapy) to walk again. Her
school will not simply accommodate the disability through ramps and
elevators, but will provide the relevant therapy as well. 16 Providing
comparable therapy to the dyslexic or Asperger's child,' 7 though,
requires training more esoteric and novel than what a physical thera-
pist receives. LD therapy also demands a compassion and perception
that is harder to summon when the child does not struggle in the visi-
ble and heart-tugging manner of the physically handicapped. The LD
student has therefore confronted the U.S. education system for ages
with a challenge that schools cannot meet with Sign Language inter-
preters and Braille books.
Congress has announced its awareness of the need for remediation.
Through the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Congress has en-
couraged schools to provide the type of reading instruction proven by
science to remediate the learning disabled.'8 Given Congress's en-
dorsement of those effective teaching techniques, why does IDEA
still fail in its mission of providing full educational opportunity to LD
students? To phrase the question differently, why does IDEA grant
accommodation and not remediation?
The answer lies in IDEA's textual weaknesses and a misguided
Supreme Court decision. The statute sets important educational goals
for schools, including "the full opportunity" mentioned earlier and
even "equal protection of the law," relative to non-LD students. 19 Yet,
13 See Gorman, supra note 5, at 54 (quoting Dr. Sally Shaywitz, a Yale neurologist who
conducts brain-scan research on LD subjects: "'The good news is we really understand the steps
of how you become a reader and how you become a skilled reader').
14 See id.
15 Id. at 55.
16 Wade F. Horn & Douglas Tynan, Time To Make Special Education "Special "Again, in
RETHINKING SPECIAL EDUCATION FOR A NEW CENTURY 23, 40 (Chester E. Finn, Jr., et al. eds.
2001).
17 Asperger's Syndrome is generally believed to be a mild form of autism.
IS Gorman, supra note 5, at 54 ("When the U.S. government launched ... No Child Left
Behind, its administrators made clear that their funding would only go to reading programs that
are based on solid evidence of the sort that has been uncovered in dyslexia research.").
19 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(6) (2005).
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the Act sets forth little guidance for how schools might meet those
goals. In the 1982 case Board of Education v. Rowley,2° the Court
attempted to provide that missing guidance. In interpreting the mean-
ing of the "free appropriate public education" guaranteed by IDEA,2'
the Court ruled that the Act only requires "some educational benefit"
and a "basic floor of opportunity" for the disabled.22 Writing for the
majority, Justice Rehnquist explained that schools meet this standard
when they merely provide "access" to the disabled.23 For the most
part, schools have been able to satisfy that requirement by simply
providing accommodations.
As a result of IDEA's vague wording, and the low standard articu-
lated in Rowley (and in the many decisions thereunder), the Supreme
Court has again applied IDEA in a manner inconsistent with congres-
sional intent. In the 2005 case Schaffer v. Weast,24 the Court held that
parents, not school districts, carry the burden of proof in IDEA-based
complaint hearings; that is, parents must prove that the school has not
met the Rowley standard. Since, under Rowley, school districts al-
ready had negligible IDEA responsibilities, Schaffer further darkens
the already bleak landscape for LD students. The only clear hope for
brightening it again lies in Congress's ability to amend IDEA.
II. THE STATUTE
Like tribes of old who would accept mysterious illnesses and
deaths as the work of the gods, the U.S. Education system for decades
treated the disabled child as a pitiable victim of ill fortune who could
never be "mainstreamed" or taught to overcome the disability. Aware
of this problem, Congress in 1975 enacted IDEA (EAHC at the time).
The statute purports to "ensure that all children with disabilities have
available to them a free appropriate public education. .. to meet their
unique needs and prepare them for.., independent living.' 25 As a
Spending Clause statute, IDEA provides funding to states in exchange
for compliance. 26 During 1999-2000, the funding amounted to a total
of $3.7 billion, or over $70 million per state.27 In accepting these
funds, states essentially waive their control over their own education
20 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
21 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A).
22 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200.
23 Id. at 194 n.18.
24 126 S. Ct. 528 (2005).
25 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A).
26 See id. § 1412(a).
27 THE ADVOCACY INST., STUDENTS WITH LEARNING DISABILITIES: A NATIONAL REVIEW
6 (2002), http://www.advocacyinstitute.org/resources/LDReview02.pdf.
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system to the extent such independence would contravene the Act's
provisions.
To meet the requirements of IDEA, state education departments
must ensure that school districts within their domain conduct evalua-
tions of any struggling student to determine whether a disability ex-
ists. 28 If that assessment identifies a disability, the district must work
with the child's parents and the school's other professionals (the
school psychiatrist, the special education director, etc.), to develop an
Individualized Education Plan (IEP). 29 A proper IEP includes a de-
tailed explanation of the student's deficiencies, the services and ac-
commodations that the school will provide to address those deficien-
cies, and annual goals toward which school staff and the student will
strive together.
30
If the parents (or, in rare cases, the school) disapproves of the IEP,
the Act empowers that party to obtain an "impartial due process hear-
ing,' '31 administered by a hearing officer not employed by the state's
education department or by any school district under its umbrella.
Section 1415 provides numerous procedural safeguards and guide-
lines, including the parent's right to counsel at the hearing32 and the
right to appeal the hearing officer's decision through a federal civil
suit.33 Although the Act assigns states the task of establishing and
maintaining procedures, there is actually little room in section 1415
for states to develop their own procedural rules. That section sets
elaborate notice requirements,34 specifies time limits for stages of the
hearing process, 35 and establishes the burden of proof as a preponder-
ance of the evidence.36 Strangely, though, the Act does not tell us on
whom the burden of proof rests. There was no agreement among the
federal circuit courts as to whom to assign the burden; different courts
assigned the burden to different parties. Thus, the issue was unre-
solved until November 2005, when the Supreme Court decided
Schaffer v. Weast.3 7
28 20 U.S.C. §1412(a)(3)(A).
29 Id. § 1414(d).
30 Id. § 1414(d)(l)(A)(i)(1)-(V) (outlining the contours of the states' obligation to create
an IEP).
31 Id. § 1415(f).
32 Id. § 1415(h)(1).
33 Id. § 1415(i)(2).
34 Id. § 1415(c).
35 Id. § 1415(c)(2)(c).
36 Id. § 1415(i)(C)(iii).
37 377 F.3d 449, 451 (4th Cir. 2004), aff'd, Schaffer v. Weast, 126 S. Ct. 528 (2005).
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III. THE CASE
Throughout elementary school, Brian Schaffer found it increas-
ingly difficult to succeed in school. Upon entering junior high school,
his problems grew so severe that his private school teachers recom-
mended he transfer to a school better equipped to address his needs.38
The Schaffers chose the local public school, Montgomery County
Middle School, where staff diagnosed him with attention deficit hy-
peractivity disorder (ADHD).39 The school crafted an IEP after the
diagnosis, but the Schaffers found it inadequate for Brian's needs and
requested an IDEA-based hearing. In Maryland these hearings are
supervised by an administrative law judge (ALJ).4 °
Both the Schaffers and the school district presented testimony by
experts whose credentials the ALJ found "impressive." 4' In fact, the
ALJ viewed the evidence from both the parents and the school to be
so persuasive, and the case so close, as to make the outcome turn on
the assignment of the burden of proof.42 Taking note of the divided
views among the circuits courts, the ALJ interpreted IDEA to endorse
a presumption that schools will make proper placements for disabled
students.43 Based on that view, he placed the burden on the parents
and thus found the IEP to be in compliance with IDEA.44
The Schaffers then filed a claim in a Maryland federal district
court where the ALJ's decision was reversed. In his majority opinion,
Judge Messite cited Wigmore for the proposition that, although the
burden of proof normally rests on the party seeking relief, an excep-
tion applies in the event of unfairness (Wigmore's fairness excep-
tion).45 Here, Judge Messite found the fact that schools possess much
more "expertise" in the realm of special education (than typical par-
ents do) sufficiently "unfair," and remanded the case with an order to
assign the burden to the school.46
In an outcome the district court surely foresaw, the ALJ then found
for the parents. When the school appealed that ruling to the same dis-
trict court that had just remanded the case, the Southern District of
38 Charles Lane & Lori Aratani, High Court To Hear Md. Special-Ed Case, WASH. POST,
Oct. 5, 2005, at B !.
39 Brian S. v. Paul L. Vance, 86 F. Supp. 2d 538, 539 (D. Md. 2000), rev'd, Weast v.
Schaffer, 240 F. Supp. 2d 396 (D. Md. 2002).
40 Id. at 540.
41 Id.
42 Weast v. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449, 451 (4th Cir. 2004), aff'd, Schaffer v. Weast, 126 S.
Ct. 528 (2005).
43 Brian S., 86 F. Supp. 2d at 540.
" Id.
45 Id. at 544-45.
SId.
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Maryland naturally affirmed the ALJ's updated judgment.47 The
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded the
case with the burden again placed on the Schaffers.48 In reaching that
decision, the court of appeals applied the same reasoning that was
initially embraced by the ALJ: that, by assigning the implementation
of IDEA to local school authorities, Congress created a presumption
that schools would fashion appropriate IEPs.49 From this viewpoint,
placing the burden on the school would be inapposite to Congress's
intentions.
The case eventually made its way to the Supreme Court, where
Justice O'Connor wrote a majority opinion based on the same the-
ory. ° O'Connor reasoned that the Schaffers were effectively asking
the "Court to assume that every IEP is invalid until the school district
demonstrates that it is not.",5' The Court did not agree with that as-
sumption. Rather, the majority felt that Congress's silence on the bur-
den issue justified the view that the burden should be allocated to the
party seeking relief12 But since the schools create the IEPs, they gen-
erally would have no reason to change them; thus, the Court's deci-
sion is better read as placing the burden of proof for IDEA hearings
on families of the disabled.
IV. WHY THE BURDEN OF PROOF MATTERS IN IDEA CASES, AND
WHY IT SHOULD REST ON SCHOOLS
A. The Wrong Arguments
The written opinions of the district court and the two Supreme
Court dissenters provide a long list of reasons why schools should
carry the burden in these cases. Although the burden should indeed lie
with schools, none of the reasons successfully justify that radical shift
from the standard rule. The best reason to place the burden on schools
arises from the nature of IDEA itself.
1. The Schaffer Dissents
In the opening salvo of her dissent, Justice Ginsburg lobs a recent
Supreme Court case back at Justice O'Connor's default adherence to
47 Weast, 377 F.3d at 451-52. The school district appealed the case on the ground that the
ALJ had incorrectly applied the burden on remand.
48 Id. at 456.
49 Id. at 455-56.
50 Schaffer v. Weast, 126 S. Ct. 528, 536 (2005).
51 Id.
52 Id. at 535.
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the old rule.53 In Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation
v. EPA,54 the Court held that the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) always carries the burden of proof in cases where a state envi-
ronmental agency seeks to reverse an EPA "stop" order. 55 In that
case, the Alaskan state agency had granted a mining permit that the
EPA found objectionable.56 Although the EPA had the choice of
blocking the permit through an injunction, it chose simply to order its
own reversal, or stop order, of the state agency's permit. The state
then sued in federal court to block the EPA's bold move. The matter
reached the Supreme Court, which assigned the burden of proof to the
EPA even though the agency was the defendant.57
Although Ginsburg invokes this case as precedent in her Schaffer
dissent, a close analysis reveals that the majority view in Schaffer
actually conforms with Alaska Department of Environmental Conser-
vation. Although the EPA was the defendant, it sought to change an
existing directive: the state agency's permit for the mining company.
Parents bringing an action pursuant to section 1415 of IDEA are in
the same position: they wish to change an existing IEP. The Supreme
Court therefore acted consistently in first placing the burden on the
EPA and then placing it on parents.
Justice Breyer's Schaffer dissent springs from section 1415's di-
rective to states that they "establish and maintain" procedures for
implementing IDEA. 58 Based on this clause, Breyer argues that the
Court should leave the burden question up to the states. 59 In suggest-
ing this compromise position between Ginsburg's and the majority's,
Breyer overlooks two aspects of the statute. First, section 1415 dic-
tates so many procedural rules to the states that the "establish and
maintain" language carries little significance. Second, an inconsistent
pattern of burden assignment among the states would run counter to
the Act's express purpose "to ensure equal protection of the law" for
students with disabilities.6 °
" Id. at 537-38, (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
540 U.S. 461 (2004).
55 Id. at 494.
56 Id. at 478-79.
57 Id. at 494.
58 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a) (2005).
59 Schaffer v. West, 126 S. Ct. 528, 541 (2005) (Breyer, J. dissenting).
60 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(6).
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2. The District Court
The Maryland District Court, as noted earlier, analyzed the burden
issue on equity grounds.61 Finding that schools have significantly
more expertise than parents in these matters, the court invoked Wig-
more's fairness exception. Under this argument, the training, re-
sources, and expert knowledge among a school's teachers and admin-
istrators make them far more capable of satisfying the burden of proof
than parents.62 The Supreme Court countered this observation by
pointing out a vital detail from the statute: under section 1415, the
school must share all that expertise with the parents as part of the IEP
and hearing process. 63 Specifically, after a school conducts an evalua-
tion of a child, IDEA requires the school to describe all tests and pro-
cedures used in its conclusions, to explain why it chose the proposed
course of action, and to list the sources consulted in reaching that
decision.64 Furthermore, the school has to explain why the IEP team
decided against other means of addressing the child's problem. 65 In
her majority opinion, Justice O'Connor argues that this vast wealth of
information, combined with the parents' right to counsel and the right
to use other experts, serve to level the playing field between the
school and the parents.66
B. A Better Rationale
Although Justice O'Connor presents the more convincing side of
the debate, she uses her salient point to arrive at the wrong conclu-
sion. Section 1415's imposition on schools actually supports the as-
signment of the burden to them. Since a school will have already pro-
duced all explanatory material before a hearing begins,67 the school's
IEP team will hardly be able to do much more in attempting to meet
its burden of persuasion. All of the information that the school must
share with the parents comprises the bulk of the evidence it will pro-
duce in an IDEA hearing. Although the school might hire experts to
testify on its behalf, as the Montgomery County school district did at
61 Justice Ginsburg also raised this point in her dissent. See Schaffer, 126 S. Ct. at 538
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
62 Brian S. v. Paul L. Vance, 86 F. Supp. 2d 538, 544 (D. Md. 2000), rev'd, Weast v.
Schaffer, 240 F. Supp. 2d 396 (D. Md. 2002).
63 Schaffer, 126 S. Ct. at 536-37.
64 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c)(1).
65 Id. § 1415(c)(1)(E).
66 Schaffer, 126 S. Ct. at 536-37.
67 See Jenkins v. Squillacote, 935 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that school districts
must provide parents with more than a mere summary explanation and that the exhaustive
explanation required by IDEA may not be deferred until the time of the hearing).
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the Schaffers' hearing, those experts will be working from the same
testing material that the family will have already received from the
school. Assigning the burden of proof to schools, therefore, does not
impose on them much more of a burden than section 1415's proce-
dural requirements already do.68
1. Board of Education v. Rowley
Indeed, if a school actually adheres to the IDEA's requirement of a
"free and appropriate education," as developed by case law, it will
find little difficulty satisfying the burden. 69 The Supreme Court made
the task easy for schools in Ro wley. There, the proposed IEP for the
deaf student Amy Rowley included routine tutoring from a speech
therapist and use of a hearing aid/amplification device.70 The parents
requested a Sign Language interpreter in place of the device, but the
school concluded that the interpreter was unnecessary, and the presid-
ing examiner at the subsequent hearing agreed.71
The Supreme Court, in a majority opinion by Justice Rehnquist,
upheld the hearing officer's decision. In language that established the
still-current standard for IDEA compliance, the Court ruled that the
"free appropriate public education" required by IDEA called only for
a program "sufficient to confer some educational benefit upon the
handicapped child., 72 Rehnquist repeatedly emphasized that Con-
gress's use of the phrase "appropriate education" demanded only ac-
cess to an education with benefits, not opportunities equivalent to
those enjoyed by nonhandicapped kids.73
To support such a minimalist standard, Rehnquist cited a few
phrases in the statute and in IDEA's legislative history. He quoted
from IDEA's provision requiring school districts to provide services
that will "assist a handicapped child to benefit from special
education., 74 In reviewing IDEA's legislative history, Rehnquist
seized on one Congressman's statement that its purpose was to create
68 Justice Ginsburg, in her dissent, shrewdly points out that, since nine states filed amicus
briefs in favor of assigning the burden of proof to school districts, the burden could not possibly
create undue costs or labor for those states. Schaffer, 126 S. Ct. at 539-40 (Ginsburg, J., dissent-
ing).
69 See Brief of the Commonwealth of Virginia and Eight Other States as Amici Curiae in
Support of the Petitioners at 6, Schaffer v. Weast, No. 04-698, 126 S. Ct. 528 (2005) (stating
that "[iun order to prevail, the school districts need only explain why their proposed IEP meets
the standards of the IDEA").
70 Bd. ofEduc. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 184 (1982).
71 Id. at 195.
72 Id. at 200.
73 Id. at 189-90.
74 Id. at 188 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17) (codified at § 1401(26)(A))).
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a "'basic floor of opportunity"' for such children. 7 With those two
phrases ("some benefit" and "floor of opportunity"), Rehnquist
molded a soft standard through which school districts have since
avoided remediation.
Rehnquist defended his approach as an act of deference to the
legislative branch, but he handpicked those phrases from many
equally prominent ones. He noted that the legislative record included
an explanation of IDEA as providing "full educational opportunities,"
and quoted one section of IDEA that requires states to set a goal of
"maximum benefits for handicapped children., 76 Yet he shrugged off
these items as "isolated phrases" and "too thin a reed" to use for
guidance. Rehnquist insisted that Congress did not intend IDEA to
provide a "full educational opportunity," even though that phrase,
unlike "some benefit" and "floor of opportunity," merits its own
section heading within section 1412 .77 However, the language of the
statue itself clearly expresses Congress's intention that schools
provide much more than "some benefit" to disabled students.
Dissenting in Rowley, Justice White points to a line in the
Congressional record that describes the Act's purpose as helping each
handicapped kid to "achieve his or her maximum potential. 78
Nonetheless, the Rowley standard has become the authoritative
measurement of IDEA compliance.79
2. Nothing Lost and Everything Gained
Given the Rowley standard, then, a school satisfies the burden of
proof through merely showing, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that its special education program provides "some benefit" to the dis-
abled student. If the school has provided that "access" to a "basic
floor of opportunity," or if a new IEP proposal provides for such
minimal assistance, then the school need not worry about the burden
of proof at an IDEA hearing. 0 Simply following section 1415's pro-
75 Id. at 200.
76 Id. at 194n.18.
77 Id. at 204 n.26.
78 Id. at 214 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-332, at 13, 19 (1975)).
79 See, e.g., Tucker v. Calloway Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 495 (6th Cir. 1998) (explaining
that a "free appropriate education" is not one that maximizes the student's potential but is rather
one that simply provides benefits to the student); E.S. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 196, 135 F.3d 566
(8th Cir. 1998) (holding that the education need not be the best possible for a dyslexic, so long
as she is benefiting from it); Union Sch. Dist. v. Smith, 15 F.3d 1519 (9th Cir. 1994) (applying
the basic floor of opportunity and benefits standard); Leonard v. McKenzie, 869 F.2d 1558,
1561 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200) (describing the Act as providing a
"basic floor of opportunity").
80 Rare is the case in which the family wins. In one D.C. Circuit case that exemplifies
those rarities, the school had provided none of the three central types of therapy promised in the
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cedural requirements will compel compliant schools, well before any
possible hearing, to produce the information that will later satisfy the
burden of persuasion.
Therefore, the only time a school will fail to meet the burden is if it
fails to provide the bare minimum of necessary services to a disabled
child. The Schaffer case itself demonstrates this awful reality. When
the burden rested on parents, they could not prove that the education
provided by Montgomery County Middle School was inadequate.
Once the burden shifted, however, the ALJ held the IEP to be insuffi-
cient.81 The burden places no grave imposition on schools, but it
places the gravest on LD students and their families. By assigning the
burden to schools, the Supreme Court would have simply fulfilled the
least demanding manifestation of IDEA's purpose: ensuring that LD
students benefit from their special education programs. For this rea-
son the traditional rule of burden assignment should be discarded. If
ever Wigmore's fairness exception carried meaning, it carries plenty
here.
C. Presumptions
In the Schaffer case, the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court ma-
jority presented a troubling and thought-provoking point: the assign-
ment of the burden to schools would imply that teachers and adminis-
trators are not adequately performing their jobs. While this
proposition may give us pause, what other explanation can be found
for IDEA's existence? At a minimum, Congress presumed that
enough schools were failing in their duties (resulting from financial
difficulties, inadequate training, etc.) to justify a multibillion dollar
disbursal each year to the states. If special education departments had
been performing their task successfully, IDEA would not exist.
As the Rowley majority noted, as of 1975, almost two million
handicapped kids received no education, and over two million more
were not receiving an "appropriate" one.82 By passing IDEA to ad-
dress that crisis, Congress certainly did not expect those numbers to
vanish overnight. Many of the Act's purposes are stated as goals, not
instant realities. Congress obviously did not presume the existence of
an effective special education system as of 1975, and IDEA has sur-
IEP: speech, occupational, and physical. Argueta v. District of Columbia, 355 F. Supp. 2d 408
(D.D.C. 2005).
81 Schaffer v. Vance, 2 F. App'x 232, 233 (4th Cir. 2001).
82 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 191.
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vived many amendments; 83 this suggests that the central goal of an
appropriate education for disabled kids has not yet been accom-
plished. Quality special education programs can be found throughout
the country, and in almost all of them any observer will find dedicated
and resourceful staff. Yet, the assumption that those programs gener-
ally meet Congress's standard of an "appropriate" education deviates
from the history of the Act.
In Schaffer, the Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit seemed to
suggest that the presumption that schools perform sufficiently com-
menced with IDEA's passage. Specifically, the Fourth Circuit argued
that Congress, by giving schools the job of developing IEPs, deferred
to their wisdom and thus created the presumption.84 Yet, the court
here blurred the distinction between assigning a task and conferring
deference; these two acts do not always overlap. After all, who else
would develop IEPs for specific students but the schools who teach
them? Congress simply gave the job of developing IEPs to the obvi-
ous parties. In doing so, Congress did not create a presumption of the
quality of the special education stemming from those IEPs.
D. The Only Meaningful Enforcement
The Supreme Court's ruling in Schaffer poses other problems. The
enforcement of IDEA's provisions takes one of three forms: the U.S.
Secretary of Education withholds funds from a noncompliant state,
the Secretary refers the matter to the Department of Justice, or a par-
ent brings a section 1415 complaint. The first two methods happen
so rarely that finding individual cases is difficult and requires re-
search back over many years.86 The third method, in contrast, is
common: 3,274 IDEA due process hearings occurred in 2000 alone.87
Given these statistics, it is clear that the parental complaint system is
the only meaningful enforcement that the Act authorizes.
88
13 Amendments to the Act occurred in 1997, 1999, and 2004.
8 Weast v. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449, 455-56 (4th Cir. 2004), affd, Schaffer v. Weast, 126
S. Ct. 528 (2005).
85 The statute lists more than these, but the ones not mentioned here are corrective and
mediation measures that lead, upon failure, to one of these three.
86 In 1994, the U.S. Department of Education attempted to withhold the annual funds from
the state of Virginia. Even then, the Fourth Circuit stayed that order pending extensive proce-
dure below. Va. Dep't of Educ. v. Riley, 23 F.3d 80 (4th Cir. 1994).
87 THE ADVOCACY INST., supra note 27, at 5.
88 The No Child Left Behind Act features much more robust enforcement procedures. Any
school failing to meet state-created goals initially receives more aid to correct the problem. If
the failing school still falls short of the required goals, even with the extra money, the staff gets
replaced. The enforcement process continues onto several more steps, if necessary: the U.S.
Department of Education will then replace the school's curriculum and finally, as a last resort,
convert the school to charter status. See Erin Kucerik, HOT TOPIC: The No Child Left Behind
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Placing the burden of proof on parents further weakens an already
weak check on negligent schools. 89 IDEA's language contains many
vague adjectives that leave room for Rowley's kind of minimal appli-
cation of IDEA. Congress devoted much attention to procedural re-
quirements, using clear and concrete words to give school districts
guidance. Yet, while the statute features clear substantive goals for
children, like "full educational opportunity," 90 even the closest review
of the Act's text and history reveals paltry guidance as to what sub-
stantive steps schools should take to reach those goals. For example,
section 1414 directs schools to a list of items to consider when devel-
oping an IEP. Although the list includes "the academic ... needs of
the child,"9' it does not include the best or even preferable educational
approaches for specific disabilities, even though section 1415 requires
schools to explain their choice of approaches to parents.
The 2004 amendment to the Act partially clarifies Congress's ex-
pectations for IEPs. Naming the amendment "Individuals with Dis-
abilities Education Improvement Act of 2004," Congress inserted a
new requirement that the school's services to disabled students be
based on "peer-reviewed research., 92 Also, an IEP team must now
consider not just the "academic" needs of a student but her "develop-
mental" and "functional" ones as well. 93 Considering the develop-
mental needs of a student and applying peer-reviewed research to
those needs will improve special education considerably. Yet, the new
language still leaves too much confusion as to what level of services a
school must provide. Who are the "peers" who would review the re-
search? Are they the faculty of graduate education programs, educa-
tion psychologists in private practice who publish in scholarly jour-
nals, or agency staff at the U.S. Department of Education? Would
mere approval by those reviewers satisfy the statute, or does the peer-
review requirement necessitate that the given teaching technique be
proven as effective? Although the 2004 amendment marks an advance
in the cause of disabled kids, the persistent ambiguity of the language
therein still allows courts to apply the modest Rowley standard.
Act of 2001: Will It Live Up to Its Promise?, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 479 (2002)
(discussing the accountability provisions in No Child Left Behind).
89 See Ortega v. Bibb County Sch. Dist., 397 F.3d 1321, 1325 (11th Cir. 2005) ("'The
IDEA's central mechanism for the remedying of perceived harms is for parents to seek changes
to a student's program.'" (quoting Polera v. Bd. of Educ., 288 F.2d 478, 483 (2d Cir. 2002))).
90 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(2) (2005).
91 Id. § 1414(d)(3).
- Id. § 1414(d)(I)(A)(i)(V).
93 Id. § 1414(d)(3)(A)(iv).
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In a similar vein, IDEA defines "special education" to mean "in-
struction ... to meet the unique needs of a child with a disability.
94
Does that language call on schools to remediate a remediable disabil-
ity (like temporary speech loss that can be diminished through ther-
apy) or merely accommodate it (like waiving the student's require-
ment to participate in class discussions)? In Rowley, the majority
certainly chose the narrowest view possible, one that undermines the
clear statutory goal of providing full opportunity to disabled students.
Ironically, it was IDEA's vague substantive standards that the Court
used to undermine that goal. Given IDEA's textual weaknesses,
Schaffer's weakening of IDEA's only effective enforcement measure
will render the statute's express purpose all but nominal.
V. AMEND!
Since Rowley and Schaffer now stand as controlling precedent,
Congress's amendment power offers the only reliable solution to
IDEA's inadequacies. As it has many times before, Congress should
amend IDEA, this time to set a clearer substantive standard under
which courts can determine whether a given school district has pro-
vided a "free and appropriate education" to a disabled student. Tech-
nically, the U.S. Department of Education could address this problem
without Congress's help by issuing new regulations that require
remediation for students in need of it. Yet, such a measure would
carry little effect, as schools voluntarily remediating would simply
continue to do so, and schools failing to do so would ignore the re-
quirement because of its unenforceability. Such regulations are unen-
forceable: parents can only enforce IDEA requirements at due process
hearings and in court, not regulatory schemes issued by the Depart-
ment of Education. Thus, the only meaningful hope for the majority
of LD families rests in Congress's amendment power. As Rehnquist
pointed out in Rowley, "Congress ... can impose no burden upon the
States unless it does so unambiguously., 95 Schools and courts have
needed that clear-cut mandate for the duration of IDEA's existence.
The Rowley opinion also repeated the standard refrain of any court
deferring to legislative power: courts do not possess the expertise to
create these type of standards. 96 Of course, the Rowley court pro-
ceeded to do just that. But in so doing, Rehnquist correctly acknowl-
edged the special wherewithal of Congress, which can review the
many advances that have been made in neuroscience and cognitive
-4 Id. § 1401(29).
95 Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 190 (1982).
96 Id. at 208.
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research.97 It can also conduct hearings to examine different experts
on the best means of remediating particular learning and physical
disabilities.
If Congress did create a clearer substantive standard, the states
could hardly protest that Congress was trespassing on their traditional
power to develop curricula as they see fit. In accepting the many mil-
lions of dollars that IDEA compliance yields, states, as noted earlier,
waive their right to exercise that power fully, at least in the sphere of
special education. In the event that Congress wants to tread lightly on
federalism issues, the amendment need not spell out every method
that schools must use. For example, Congress could simply require
that states employ the best current teaching method for each disabil-
ity, as endorsed by the U.S. Department of Education. If Congress can
call on schools to use the best special education teaching methods in
the No Child Left Behind Act, and if it can also demand that any
teaching be based on peer-reviewed research (in the 2004 amend-
ment), certainly it can require those best methods in a new amend-
ment.98 Congress need not ignore that certain methods for teaching
dyslexics and Asperger's children have been established as the most
effective, currently available approaches. By requiring those methods
in cases where the IEP team confirms one of those conditions, Con-
gress would make its generalized mandates more specific, and thus
more effective.
The amendment should also address the issue of remediation
versus accommodation. In Rowley, Rehnquist denounced the notion
that IDEA provides equal opportunity "regardless of [the student's]
capacity." 99 This view ignores the distinction between students whose
disability never changes (the permanently blind) and those whose
disability can be diminished through proper teaching methods (like
dyslexics and students with mild speech impairments). Rowley lumps
all disabled students into the first category by only promising
"access" at a "base floor of opportunity." In other words, the courts
have essentially construed IDEA to provide accommodation, not
remediation.
Not everyone who works in the area of special education law
agrees with this assertion. Some practitioners have successfully
argued in due process hearings that IDEA does require remediation. 100
97 Id. ("We previously have cautioned that courts lack the 'specialized knowledge and ex-
perience' necessary to resolve 'persistent and difficult questions of educational policy."' (quot-
ing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42 (1973)).
98 Gorman, supra note 5, at 54.
" Rowley, 458 U.S. at 199.
'0o See Evans v. Bd. of Educ., 930 F. Supp. 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). The hearing officer had
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That success, however, does not reflect an established judicial or
statutory rule. In the course of my work on this article, I discussed
this debate with four lawyers currently in practice as advocates for
families in IDEA-based due process hearings. In answering the
article's central question (Does IDEA require remediation?), the four
lawyers gave four different responses. One said that the statute
indisputably requires it. A second said that the statute actually
requires neither remediation nor accommodation but rather just the
"individualized benefit" articulated in Rowley, regardless of whether
the services amount to either of those two categories. The last two
attorneys both stated simply that the statute does not require
remediation, but those two explained their answers in different ways.
The first emphasized that justifying his answer would be difficult; the
other more confidently asserted her position while cautioning against
use of the word remediation, as that word creates confusion in the
legal community.
Such divergence in opinions among four learned practitioners
highlights the need for Congressional clarification. Courts have per-
haps inadvertently contributed to the terminology confusion described
by the last lawyer. The word remediation almost never appears in a
court's opinion, but when it did, the court implicitly defined the term
far differently than special education professionals do. In Independent
School District No. 283 v. S.D. °101 the court mentioned in dicta that
"IDEA does not demand that the State cure the disabilities which im-
pair a child's ability to learn, but requires a program of remediation
which would allow the child to learn notwithstanding her disabil-
ity.' ' 10 2 The goal of accommodation is to allow a child to learn "not-
withstanding her disability." Remediation's goal is to make accom-
modation less necessary or not necessary at all, so that the child can
learn not despite the disability, but rather as if it did not exist.10 3 Since
reaching that second goal may take a long time for many LD students,
they need both accommodation and remediation in the interim. The
standard set by this court addresses the first goal but not the second.
While using the word remediation, all the court requires of school
districts is accommodation.
"directed the [School] District to put in place immediately a program similar to that outlined in
the October 1994 IEP, [and] also to update it." Id. at 92. Although this arrangement failed to
satisfy the family, both the IEP and that update included remediation. Id. at 91-92.
101948 F. Supp. 860 (D. Minn. 1995).
102Id. at 885.
103 Gorman, supra note 5, at 54 ("Some studies suggest that the right kinds of instruction
provided early enough may rewire the brain so thoroughly that the neurological glitch disap-
pears entirely.").
2006]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Indeed, the IEP for the student in that case provided actual reme-
diation before the parents filed a claim: she had been receiving one-
on-one remedial reading instruction in the multisensory method from
which dyslexics derive the greatest benefit. 104 The parents did not file
the claim in order to obtain remediation, but rather to have their
daughter repeat the third grade and be assigned to the same tutor
every year. 10 5 Therefore, the case did not turn on what level of ser-
vices IDEA requires, but rather on how much discretion schools may
exercise under IDEA in making placements for disabled students. By
mentioning the minimal requirements of IDEA, the court was merely
explaining how the school exceeded the statute's demands.
Other federal court opinions have also inadvertently propelled the
current confusion regarding IDEA's requirements. The IEP for the
dyslexic student in Evans v. Board of Education1°6 provided accom-
modation but not the specific multisensory remediation that his
mother had requested.10 7 The staff of the student's public school did
not possess the training necessary to offer that kind of remedial in-
struction; so the mother requested that the school pay for his place-
ment at a private school whose staff had been trained in that proper
technique (called the "Orton-Gillingham" method). 0 8 Even with the
public school's accommodations, the student, Frank, was still failing
every course and deriving no meaningful education by attending the
school. Given those extreme circumstances, the court reasoned that
the remediation requested by the mother amounted to the only way in
which the school could meet Rowley's requirement of access and an
individualized benefit.' 09
Some observers of the Evans decision and those like it might con-
clude that IDEA requires remediation, but the Evans court's remedy
should not be construed as a substantive expansion of Rowley's rule.
The uniquely severe nature of the disability in that case led the court
to order remediation, but that order does not amount to a rule requir-
ing remediation in all cases where the student stands to gain a full
educational opportunity only through such services. Rather, the spe-
cific facts of that case called for a result that less severely disabled
students would likely not obtain in the same court. If mere accommo-
dation had allowed Frank to pass some classes and gain some access
to his education, the court would not likely have ordered remediation.
14Id.
1o5 Id. at 874.
106930 F. Supp. 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
l07ld. at 91, 100.
1os Id. at 92-93.
1091d. at 87, 100, 102.
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Yet, ironically, less severely disabled students have a greater chance
of advancing beyond the need for accommodation should schools
remediate them. In amending IDEA to expressly require remediation
for those more typical students, Congress would lend substance to the
stirring rhetoric of the Act's text.
That distinction between accommodation and remediation proba-
bly helps account for the thousands of due process hearings every
year. An amendment that requires schools to apply the best teaching
methods for remediation will likely result in fewer complaining par-
ents and fewer students left languishing in special education pro-
grams. Every classroom and special education program in the country
would feel the repercussions of such a change. Researchers estimate
that up to 20 percent of all schoolchildren suffer from a specific read-
ing disability alone. 110 The Senate Report for the statute states that
"[w]ith proper education services, many [disabled students] would be
able to become productive citizens, contributing to society instead of
being forced to remain burdens. Others, through such services, would
increase their independence, thus reducing their dependence on soci-
ety.""' 1 In IDEA, Congress therefore proclaims its goal to make dis-
abled students independent, a goal left unfulfilled in too many
cases. 112 Mere accommodation only makes the bright LD student's
dependence more comfortable and enduring.
A new amendment could allow the entire IEP team, as a whole, to
make the determination that remediation would benefit the student in
a manner that accommodation alone would not. The amendment
could require remediation only in the cases where the team makes that
determination. That narrowing limitation on the requirement would
balance the traditional deference to schools' expertise with the indi-
vidual student's entitlement to a free, appropriate education. 13
Congress, however, could simply nullify Schaffer's harm by plac-
ing the burden of proof in section 1415 hearings back on the school
districts. Obviously, LD children will gain more from an amendment
requiring remediation. If Congress fails to make either change,
though, it will share responsibility with the Supreme Court for the
failure of the nation's special education system.
10 Gorman, supra note 5, at 53.
' S. REP. No. 94-168, at 9 (1975).
112 0 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(1) (2005).
113 Gorman, supra note 5, at 54.
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VI. CONCLUSION
As one might expect, the costs of remediation will run much
higher than those of accommodation. Ironically, though, by spending
the greater amount of money necessary to educate LD students ap-
propriately, Congress will likely save more money in the long term.
The latest research indicates that remediation would ultimately make
special education programs unnecessary for the majority of LD stu-
dents. 114 Once an LD student is fully remediate, she can reenter the
mainstream, sometimes without accommodations. At present, about
three million American students with remediable learning disabilities
are enrolled in special education programs.' 15 That number represents
half of all the students in special education programs generally.
1 6
Since Congress currently spends several billion dollars per year on
those programs, 1 7 an amendment that enables kids to depart special
education would constitute not only a moral milestone but a finan-
cially prudent one as well.
The Rowley dissenters cited two shining moments in the legislative
history of IDEA. Justice Blackmun quoted Congress's intent to estab-
lish "equal educational opportunity" for disabled students." 8 Justice
White cited the goal of leading disabled students to their "maximum
potential" in his argument that IDEA does require equal educational
opportunity.' 19 The Rowley majority, and the cases decided there-
under, have successfully kept such equality from becoming a reality.
The Rowley opinion expressly denigrates the equality standard as
"unworkable" and "too complex," language that recalls, disturbingly,
the arguments against racial equality in schools at the turn of the last
century. 120 What, exactly, is so intolerable about an attempt at educa-
l"4 Id. at 54-55.
115d. at 55.
116 THE ADVOCACY INST., supra note 27, at 1.
117Id. at 6.
118Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 210 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting
S. REP. No. 94-168 (1975)).
119Id. at 214 (White, J., dissenting).
120ld. at 198-99 (majority opinion); see Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 175
U.S. 528 (1899). In this case, black taxpayer-residents of a Georgia county had sued to compel
that county to spend equal tax dollars on students of both races. The Supreme Court responded
to the plaintiffs' request by asserting that "it is impracticable to distribute taxes equally." Id. at
542.
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tional equality? Congress holds the power to answer that question in
an inspiring step.
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